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This study aims to analyse Russian oil & gas and banking industries from the point of 
view of M&A activity. In a form of case study, a brief history of M&A deals in both 
industries is presented and analysed in a context of Russian culture and economic 
environment. The study suggests that Russia is an extremely interesting and important 
example of a transitioning economy that could be useful for analysis of M&A activity in 
emerging markets. Research suggests that Russian economy through its short history 
has taken a path of strong consolidation and its key industries are now represented by 
few large players. History of M&A in Russia is full with hostile takeovers and scandals, 
while the level of foreign investments always remained low. Possible reasons for that 
could be found in Russia’s cultural and historical background, especially in the strength 
of informal institutions in the managerial practices. The study opens a discussion for 
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Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are one of the hottest topic in modern economics. They 
are defined as transactions in which the ownership of the companies, other business 
organizations or their operating units are transferred or combined. It spurs interest of 
researchers all over the world, since it combines technicalities of finance with science of 
governing business, bringing change, creating growth strategies and managing people, all 
attributed to the discipline of management. It is also an extremely interesting topic from 
the legal point of view. Financial side of M&A includes valuation, ways of funding the 
transaction (cash on hand vs. issue of debt vs. issue of stock), ways of payment (cash vs. 
stock), and various other aspects. But when two companies merge, questions of cultural 
and organizational fit arise as well, making it an extremely broad and complicated topic. 
Which company to target, who is going to manage the process, who will stay and who 
will go, how fast should the integration process be, what obstacles may arise on the way 
– all these questions have to be answered in preparation and during the implementation 
of the M&A deal.  
The world economy is constantly growing, humanity creates new technology, new types 
of business emerge, and one of the most common strategies for growth nowadays is 
growing externally, using mergers and acquisitions to increase the influence of the 
company on the economy, grow its market share, etc. There are lots of motives for M&A, 
including potential utilization of economies of scale (Tirole, 1988), economies of scope 
(Motta, 2004), materialization of potential synergies that arise from combining assets of 
two companies, taxation motives, meaning that a company that generates profit can 
acquire a company that bears losses to reduce its tax burden (Burton & Levin-Nussbaum, 
2014). Geographical expansion, which is a goal for any multinational corporation (MNC), 
can be conveyed through series of cross-border acquisitions. Market diversification can 
be achieved by acquisition of business that are unrelated to the core business of the 
company. Additional reasons include alternative ways of recruitment of talent, acquiring 
knowledge and other intangible assets, such as brands.  
As already mentioned, M&A is intensively researched by scientists all over the world. 
However, this research is often focused exclusively on the developed markets, such as 




the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom, or Japan, while emerging 
markets often are overlooked (Angwin, Mellahi, Gomes, & Peter, 2016). Nevertheless, 
emerging markets are extremely interesting objects for analysis, since they often grow at 
a much faster pace, which fosters mergers and acquisitions activity. In particular, it is 
important to look at the largest emerging markets, such a China, India, Brazil, South 
Africa, and Russia. For instance, Zou & Simpson (2008) show that deregulation can 
significantly affect M&A activity on the example of China, which can have great 
implications for other heavily regulated emerging economies. Kumar & Bansal (2008) in 
their quite recent research on M&A activity in India emphasize the fact that the amount 
of research with significantly big number of cases on M&A in India is quite low and 
provide some interesting findings that are discussed a bit later in this study. 
Among those countries, Russia is a particularly rare subject for research. Several reasons 
attribute to that, including lack of data, relative novelty of Russian market economy, 
language barrier and others. However, if China is becoming increasingly popular with 
researchers, so should Russia, as both countries are moving towards a capitalistic 
economic model, and a large amount of M&A activity is to be expected from both 
countries.  
This study attempts to systemize the history of M&A activity in Russia in several 
industries, namely oil & gas and banking industry: two key spheres of Russian economics. 
Author attempts to systemize knowledge on M&A success factors, specifics of M&A in 
developing countries, as well as peculiar characteristics of Russian economy. After that, 
using open sources of secondary data, such as open databases and news articles, a brief 
history of M&A activity in oil & gas and banking industries is presented in a form of a 
case study. The key point of a case study is to create a big picture of what M&A activity 
in the most important industries in Russia looks like, create a map and a timeline of 
mergers and acquisitions that happened in Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union, give 
insights on how Russian peculiar culture influences the way M&A deals are implemented 
in Russia, compare M&A activity in oil & gas and banking; but most importantly this 
research is an attempt to boost interest to Russia as a subject for the research on M&A 
activity.  




Oil & gas industry was chosen due to its importance to the Russian economy, which relies 
heavily on natural resources. M&A activity in Russia was quite atypical, especially in the 
1990s, it was characterized by an unusually big involvement of the government, 
corruption, huge amount of lawsuits and other scandals, which makes the research on this 
topic different from any other industry in any other country. It is important to look at 
these examples and issues through the lens of Russian cultural background and the legacy 
of the Soviet Union.  
Banking industry, while being vastly different from oil & gas industry in all aspects, from 
the number of players in the market, to the products and services it offers, is also very 
indicative of M&A conjuncture in Russia. While there was no large merger of two 
Russian banks in the history as of yet, largest Russian banks, most of them owned by the 
state, showed sustainable growth and often choose to accumulate assets and expand by 
acquiring smaller banks, quite frequently in financial distress.  
The M&A activities in Russia showcase some peculiar patterns, namely hostility, 
complications in communication, lack of integration and interdependence between the 
acquirer and the target. It is important to understand, why M&A in Russia looks the way 
it does, which factors influence it, what dynamics can one expect from M&A in Russia, 
and what lessons can Russian managers and government take from the previous 
experience, as well experience of other countries, both developed and developing ones. 
Comparative analysis of two industries is also extremely important. If M&A activity in a 
particular industry has some notable characteristics, it is important to understand, which 
of them are mostly explained by the cultural background of the country, and which can 
be attributed to the specifics of the industry. 
The structure of the study is as follows: first, a thorough analysis of background literature 
on the most relevant topics is conducted, then the methodology of the case study is 
established, after which the qualitative analysis of the Russian oil & gas and banking 
industries is presented in a form of descriptive findings. After the analysis is done, 
suggestions for further research on related topics are provided. 
 




2 Background literature 
There is a vast amount of academic literature dedicated to research of mergers and 
acquisitions, relying on both the quantitative analysis, using regressions and other 
available tools for data handling, as well as qualitative analysis, most notably case studies 
that use various tools such as interviews, observation, coding, etc. For the purpose of this 
research, the main focus of the literature review was articles dedicated to analysing 
different factors that influence the success of M&A deals. While this field of research is 
very large and full of crucial helpful insights, it must be noted that there is a clear lack of 
systematic approach to the problem, which makes connecting the dots and reaching the 
academic consensus ever so complicated. Thus, a very thorough analysis of literature that 
exists up to date has to be conveyed. Leading economic journals were chosen as the main 
source of articles on this topic. Gomes, Barnes, & Mahmood (2016) identified key 
journals that contain the highest number of articles on the topic of M&A. Those include 
Strategic Management Journal, International Business Review, Journal of Management 
Studies, Journal of International Business Studies, Harvard Business Review and many 
other respectable journals. 
Another category of relevant literature is one dedicated to analysing different markets, 
classified by geographic factors or industries, that showcase the history of mergers and 
acquisitions in particular countries and spheres. Furthermore, since this research is 
dedicated to Russian market, articles on M&A deals in Russia are a specific focus of the 
literature review. In addition to that, other academic studies about Russia, including 
managerial, historic, and even psychological ones were used for better understanding of 
peculiar qualities that Russian business environment has. Since research relied heavily on 
open sources of information, magazine and journal articles describing specific deals were 
a valuable source of insight. 
2.1 What are the key factors for the success of M&A deals? 
Critical M&A success factors can be divided into two basic categories: pre-merger and 
post-merger factors, which can be further split into several key points (Gomes E. , 
Angwin, Weber, & Tarba, 2013). The analysis of factors presented further relies heavily 




on the classification suggest by Gomes et al. (2013), about the critical success factors 
involved in the pre- and post-merger processes.  
One of the most important pre-merger factors that determines the future success of the 
deal comes in the very beginning of the M&A process, it is the search, evaluation and 
selection of the merger partner or acquisition target (Kitching, 1967). Many 
characteristics of the target that can be evaluated prior to the deal can influence the 
success rate, for instance, one may logically assume that market relatedness between the 
buyer and the target should not only increase investor’s expectations of potential gains, 
but also lead to higher value creation after the merger. However, research does not seem 
to support this wide-spread notion, in fact, many researchers claim that some market and 
product relatedness is not necessarily better than none (Lubatkin, 1987). However, there 
are other types of fit, most notably organizational (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986) and strategic 
(Napier, 1989; Lubatkin, 1987), that can certainly increase the potential of the successful 
deal.  
Another critical success factor is pre-merger valuation process conveyed by the buyer. 
While value creation from synergies after the merger depends on the ways companies fit, 
there is also a question of how much of this new created value goes to buyer’s 
shareholders, and how much goes to the target’s shareholders. This division of the whole 
pie depends most notably on the price that the buyer pays for the target, thus making the 
valuation process crucial for the success of the deal (Howell, 1970). It can also be claimed 
that destroying the value for the buyer’s shareholders can have further negative effects on 
the integration process after the merger, destroying the synergies and worsening the 
situation even further. Inkpen, Sundaram, & Rockwood (2000) claim that in the U.S. hi-
tech market “acquiring firm’s shareholders do not get more than they pay for, and often 
get less. In contrast, the shareholders of acquired firms walk away with stock price gains 
of anywhere from 20% to 30%.” That clearly illustrates how important the valuation and 
the price paid for the target is for the success of the M&A deal.  
Another pre-merger success factors include matches or mismatches in size of the two 
firms. Acquiring the target both too big or too small will lead to low returns and a lot of 
difficulties in the integration process, while mergers between firms with similar sizes tend 
to lead to much better performance (Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002). In addition, many 




authors emphasize the importance of a so-called “courtship period”, a phase before the 
deal that allows both parties to get to know each other and each other’s corporate culture 
and differences better (Gomes E. , Angwin, Weber, & Tarba, 2013; Kitching, 1967; 
Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). It is particularly important for the cases, where cultural 
differences are more severe, for instance, in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In a 
case of cross-border M&A, not evaluating all the risks connected to the cultural gaps 
properly can lead to a failure after the deal (Li & Guisinger, 1991).  
Finally, there is also evidence that motivation of the managers of the acquired firm is 
extremely important for the post-merger success, which means that establishing a correct 
compensation policy that creates right incentives for the management is extremely 
important (Inkpen, Sundaram, & Rockwood, 2000). It has to be noted, however, that 
purely incentivizing managers with upfront stock payments, for example, can have 
negative consequences, as it encourages opportunistic behavior, and managers’ and 
shareholders’ incentives have to be aligned for a success of a newly formed company 
(Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007). 
Obviously, the success of an M&A deal is not completely pre-determined prior to the 
completion of the deal. There are several post-merger success factors that have to be taken 
into account as well. Probably the most important one is the integration strategy that is 
employed to make a newly acquired business a functioning part of a freshly created larger 
mechanism. Multiple researchers agree on the fact that even a perfectly prepared merger 
or acquisition is not going to be effective and give good results, unless a proper, fitting 
integration strategy is chosen and implemented (Schweiger & Weber, 1989; Haspeslagh 
& Jemison, 1991). What is particularly interesting, even in integration there is such a 
thing as overkill, as extensively high integration can lead to the clashes between two 
corporate cultures, which is especially important for cross-border mergers (Weber & 
Schweiger, 1992).  
As the base of knowledge accumulated on M&A deals was growing with time, many 
researchers attempted to classify the integration strategies implemented by the 
companies. One intuitive way of doing that is looking at the level of integration, meaning 
how closely the business processes of a newly acquired target are going to be entwined 
into the existing business structure of the acquirer. Almost half a century ago Howell 




(1970) proposed classifying M&A deals by the motivation into three groups: financial, 
marketing and manufacturing. In a marketing merger, two companies serve the same 
market, or markets that are related, but the manufacturing processes do not relate. The 
opposite is true for the manufacturing mergers. Financial mergers are those of two 
companies with unrelated manufacturing that serve unrelated markets. These different 
types of deals require different integration strategies. Financial acquisition implies rapid 
growth after the deal, highly diversified program and emphasis on financial relations, it 
also requires the most extensive evaluation procedure, as the acquirer has to appraise 
target’s product portfolio, as well as marketing and manufacturing processes that are not 
common for the buying firm. Marketing acquisition is less broad, allows for slower, more 
thorough evaluation, since the marketing processes do not require evaluation, and it 
implies moderate growth, purchases limited to specific areas, and emphasis on marketing 
relationships. Finally, the manufacturing acquisition is made when slow, steady growth 
is the goal that the acquirer’s management keeps in mind. These deals usually have a very 
narrow program and put emphasis on manufacturing relationships. These different types 
of deals also imply different levels of flexibility for the target’s management. In a case of 
a financial acquisition, the acquired management is often allowed the highest flexibility, 
almost autonomous operation, limited only by the financial constraints of the corporation, 
while in manufacturing mergers, the acquiring management is given a task of integrating 
their business processes completely into the business structure of the acquirer. It has to 
be noted, however, that the classification is not strict, the types of acquisitions are not 
mutually exclusive, and the same company can vary its strategy, depending on current 
goals and potential targets as in time, different programs of acquisition-oriented 
companies almost always form into a combinational pattern; meaning that they include 
financial acquisitions, acquisitions for specific market areas, and very narrowly defined 
manufacturing acquisitions. It has to be noted that since this research is dedicated to 
particular industries solely in Russia market, financial and manufacturing acquisitions are 
expected to be the most frequent in the case study.  
Besides the strategic intent of the acquisition, the cultural differences, as already 
mentioned, should be taken into account. But not only should they be accounted for, they 
also have to be dealt with during the integration process. Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 
(1988) claim that “the degree of congruence between the acquirer and the acquired 




organizations’ preferred modes of acculturation will affect the level of acculturative 
stress” and that “the latter will in turn either facilitate or hinder the implementation of the 
merger”. Gomes et al. (2013) reference the integration strategies classification framework 
provided by Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) as the most comprehensive to date. It 
categorizes mergers and acquisitions into four stylistic groups, namely Absorption, 
Holding, Preservation and Symbiotic. The division is done in accordance with the 
placement of the deal in two separate dimensions: need for target’s organizational 
autonomy and its need for strategic interdependence. If both of those factors are low, it is 
a holding acquisition, in which little autonomy is allowed, but the acquired business is 
not integrated heavily in the acquirer’s structure. If the need for organizational autonomy 
is low, but the need for strategic interdependence is high, authors call it absorption, the 
acquiring company absorbs the acquired firm completely. This is often a time-consuming 
integration process, especially in the case of larger firms. If the opposite is true, meaning 
there is a huge need for organizational autonomy, but no need for strategic 
interdependence, such acquisition can be categorized as preservation. In that case the 
acquirer holds the assets of the target, but barely intervenes in the business processes or 
makes any changes to the structure. This is often the case with cross-border acquisitions, 
where the acquirer first learns from the experience of the target, preparing for later 
expansion into new markets. Finally, when both the strategic interdependence and 
organizational autonomy are needed highly, it is called a symbiosis, which requires the 
longest and hardest integration process that can be extremely costly for a company, since 
the new business has to be integrated, but the autonomy also has to be kept. Higher 
integration often leads to the willingness of top management of the target company to 
leave (Ahammad, Glaister, Weber, & Tarba, 2012), which makes it difficult to ensure the 
autonomy.  
Ultimately, the research on integration strategies indicates, that the key to a successful 
merger or acquisition lies in balance between the sufficient level of integration and ability 
to sustain the level of knowledge accumulated by both companies, retaining key 
employees and resources. Insufficient integration leads to the loss of potential synergies, 
but integration that is too high, through the loss of target’s autonomy can lead to dilution 
of knowledge and departure of important parts of the management team, which will lead 
the merger to failure (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992). Cording, 




Christman & King (2008) name top management turnover as one of the key, oft-cited 
issues in M&A and claim that “managers represent potentially valuable resources in the 
combined firm that may be lost during integration.”  
Post-acquisition leadership is another important matter that influences the results of an 
M&A deal. Hyde & Paterson in their analysis of the Astra and Zeneca merger in 1999 
emphasize “the importance of managing change proactively, the need to have clear 
objectives that are aligned with the company’s strategic objectives and that also meet the 
needs of the participants and, crucially, maintaining senior management support.” (2001, 
p. 266) 
In addition to the quality of change management and the integration strategy, the pace at 
which the merger is completed is also extremely important. This side of the M&A deals 
was relatively rarely emphasized in the academic literature, however, its importance is 
becoming increasingly recognized (Gomes E. , Angwin, Weber, & Tarba, 2013). Angwin 
(2004) calls speed of integration “the new mantra in business promising advantage, 
prosperity and success” and claims that in the M&A sphere the first 100 days of 
implementation of the integration strategy are crucial, just like in the U.S. presidency. 
Several reasons are cited, most notably the fact that times costs money, long integration 
means longer periods of uncertainty that are stressful both to the management and regular 
employees, and that the excitement and high expectations of stakeholders are the highest 
on early stages, right after the deal is finalized. Rapid integration allows to take advantage 
of the investors high hopes for the success of the deal, capturing their support for the 
actions of the management team. Due to these factors, those acquisitions that act quicker 
and bring more change during the first 100 days tend to be perceived successful more 
often, and the perception of success helps leading to further success as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. The author also notes, however, that even though the perception of success 
worsens over time, after three or four years, when the results of the integration become 
visible, there is a new wave of excitement in success perception by stakeholders. 
For the M&A deal to be successful it is also extremely important that the management 
team that leads the integration process keeps paying attention to the regular day-to-day 
operations of the company. Otherwise, while focusing on materialization of new potential 
synergies, the company can lose even more due to decline of its regular activities. 




Evidence shows that management tends to pay less attention to the day-to-day business 
during the post-merger integration process, especially in the larger mergers (Ghemawat 
& Ghadar, 2000). This could potentially lead to competitors taking some market share 
from the participants of the merger. For instance, Ghemawat & Ghadar (2000) provide an 
example of a pharmaceutical company, Merck, refraining from any large M&A deals and 
focusing on its current business while Glaxo Welcome and SmithKline Beecham were 
deeply consume by their merger that would lead to creation of one of the largest 
pharmaceutical companies in the industry, GlaxoSmithKline. This distraction could allow 
Merck to strengthen its position in the market through aggressive marketing and other 
measures. 
It is extremely important to establish proper communication between the acquirer and the 
target not only prior to the deal, but also during the integration process. Schweiger & 
DeNisi (1991) showed that communicating a realistic preview of a merger to the 
employees can reduced deficiencies and dysfunctional outcomes of the deal. This 
research was done in a form of a longitudinal field experiment with two plants: the 
experimental one, in which the merger was conveyed with an implementation of a 
communication program called “a realistic merger preview”, and a control plant with a 
traditional way of managing the merger. Data was collected in a form of four surveys at 
four different points in time prior to and after the announcement of the merger. The 
“realistic merger preview” program implied providing employees with a lot more 
detailed, honest, immediate information on how the merger is going to affect the plant 
and its workers, compared to the usual merger procedure. The experiment helped to prove 
that mergers have negative effects on the employees, increasing uncertainty, but more 
importantly, that proper communication helps to decrease the level of uncertainty and 
avoid the dysfunctional outcomes that a merger could have. On the contrary, however, 
some researchers provide evidence that providing too much information to the employees 
can also harm the integration process. Due to its complexity, management team needs 
flexibility in its actions, which means that it cannot provide the workers with a 
comprehensive, complete plan of action, and has to keep a touch of vagueness to its 
rhetoric. Eisenberg & Witten state that “the manager who is overly explicit in the 
statement of missions and goals also takes a risk” and “when missions are couched in 
unequivocal terms, conflict is unavoidable; when goals are stated concretely, they often 




are strikingly ineffective” (1987, p. 422). Thus, just like with any other success factor that 
was mentioned above, balance is extremely important in communication between the 
change leaders who implement the integration strategy and regular employees who suffer 
the negative consequences that materialize in a form of uncertainty cause by the merger 
of the two companies.  
Cultural differences, mentioned before, also have to be carefully dealt with. In a case of 
cross-border M&A it was shown that larger national cultural distance leads to worse 
financial performance (Datta & Puia, 1995). However, differences do not necessarily 
stem from cultural differences between countries that two companies are located in. Even 
if both firms are based in the same country, corporate cultures can vastly differ from one 
another. Chatterjee et al. (1992) claim that their findings “suggest a strong inverse 
relationship between perceptions of cultural differences  and shareholder gains, after 
controlling for perceptions of the buying firm’s tolerance for multiculturalism and the 
relative size of the merging firms.”  
There is, however, evidence of the positive influence of cultural differences between the 
acquirer and the target on the results of M&A. For instance, Morosini, Shane & Singh 
(1998), using an empirical regression analysis of 52 cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions that happened in a period from 1987 to 1992, showed a positive correlation 
between the national cultural distance and M&A performance. They attribute this to the 
emerging access to both the target’s and the acquirer’s “diverse set of routines and 
repertoires embedded in national culture.” Akanni and Ahammad (2015) seem to agree 
with this alternative hypothesis, claiming that if the cultural distance is retained after the 
merger it allows to realize the potential synergies that lie in the exchange of valuable 
resources and skills. Effective transfer of the unique capabilities between the two parties   
often leads to the improvement of the M&A performance. 
Stahl and Voigt (2008) attempted to create a comprehensive analysis of the influence of 
cultural differences on mergers and acquisitions, recognizing that there is evidence of 
both negative and positive effects. Their framework takes into account two merger 
performance indicators: the realization of synergies reflected in improvements of the 
company’s financials, and shareholder’s value creation that is measured by cumulative 
abnormal returns. Cultural differences, according to the authors, can have effect on the 




shareholder’s value creation both in short term and long term. In the first case, they 
influence expectations of investors about how the acquirer is going to perform in the 
future. In the second case, they affect the probability of actual economic benefits being 
generated. This process, obviously, requires synergies to be realized. Synergies are 
critical to almost any merger or acquisition, except for the unusual case when the target 
is acquired at a large discount (Schweiger D. , 2002).  
The first hypothesis proposed by Stahl and Voigt (Stahl & Voigt, 2008) is that cultural 
differences between firms are negatively associated with sociocultural integration 
outcomes. They claim that the most important aspects of this integration that can 
influence the realization of the synergies are the emergence of positive attitudes toward 
the new organization and creation of a feeling of unity, development of trust between the 
members of the organization, a sense of shared identity. There is an extensive amount of 
scientific evidence that show that people tend to trust those who have similar values (Darr 
& Kurtzberg, 2000), so this proposal seems absolutely logical. This hypothesis is 
supported by the empirical research, although the effect seems to be a bit smaller than 
authors expected it to be.  
The second hypothesis is that cultural differences are negatively associated with the 
realization of synergies. This statement is a lot more questionable and there is no intuitive 
answer. Due to the mechanisms described by the first proposition, there is a power that 
decreases the likelihood of synergy realization. However, as mentioned before, there is 
evidence that cultural differences lead to exchange of unique capabilities, which in turn 
leads to the more likely realization of synergies. However, it is reasonable to assume that 
higher level of cultural differences will make the exchange of unique capabilities a lot 
more complicated. However, the second hypothesis is not supported, which means that 
positive and negative effects of cultural differences can offset each other and we cannot 
be certain that they have negative influence on the likelihood of the realization of 
synergies. 
Hypothesis 3 focuses on the shareholder’s value and is split in two parts in accordance 
with the short term and long term effect framework. Authors assume that higher cultural 
differences will lead to lower returns for shareholders at the moment of the merger 
announcement, as well as lower post-acquisition stock returns. This argument stems 




straight from the efficient-market hypothesis that suggests that all the information 
available is included in the stock price (Fama, 1970). However, this hypothesis was not 
supported by the empirical analysis.   
Fourth hypothesis compares the effect of organizational cultural differences on the 
performance of the merger and the effect of national cultural differences. Effects on 
sociocultural integration, synergy realization and shareholder value are taken into 
account. Authors claim that national cultural difference are less important for the success 
of the acquisition than the organizational cultural differences, and they also have more 
potential positive effects. This hypothesis was supported with regards to sociocultural 
integration and synergy realization.  
Finally, fifth hypothesis suggests that in the case of high relatedness of two companies, 
cultural differences have a greater negative impact than when companies are loosely 
related. Again, this hypothesis holds true with regards to sociocultural integration and 
synergy realization.  
Overall, Stahl and Voigt (2008) show that the impact of cultural difference can vary 
depending on the situation and that there is no single simple answer, since every M&A 
deal is different. Their findings tell the investors to be cautious in times of mergers, but 
not to panic and keep in mind that there is some upside to cultural differences, especially 
differences between national cultures of two countries in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. 
As mentioned above, success of a merger or acquisition can rely heavily on the ability of 
companies to transfer their unique capabilities. That problem is closely related to human 
resource management. Effective HRM is key to the successful merger and acquisition 
performance, and that applies to various countries, especially developing economies like 
Israel (Weber & Tarba, 2010) or Nigeria (Gomes E. , Angwin, Peter, & Mellahi, 2012). 
Kitching (1967) emphasizes six main statements that could be made based on interview 
from managers that were involved in M&A deals about the success factors. Firstly, the 
potential synergies that the merger can generate do not play a role as significant as 
“managers of change” do, meaning that people that could manage the integration process 




are the most critical success factor for the deal. Secondly, Kitching states that if the 
managerial competence of both the acquirer and the target teams summarized fails to 
suffice the demand for the managerial tasks of the new company, such merger is destined 
to fail, the author even claims this to be a sort of “physical law” due to frequency of it 
being mentioned by interviewees. While seeming obvious, this fact is often overlooked 
by the participants of failing mergers. Thirdly, communication, or reporting standards 
established between the two firms determines the success of the deal quite heavily. Fourth 
success factor is the existence or lack of general vision, a growth strategy in an acquiring 
firm. Firms that just behave opportunistically and try to acquire another firm cheap 
without having any particular vision of integrating the business processes tend to fail a 
lot more frequently. Fifth factor boils down to how experienced the acquirer is, since 
cool-headed appraisal in the times of heated negotiations is necessary, and the more 
experienced the buyer is – the higher is the quality of the appraisal. Finally, many firms 
often underestimate the amount of funds and time that has to be dedicated to the newly 
acquired target. That could also decrease the return on investment.  
2.2 Analysing specifics of M&A practices in developing markets 
While M&A practices have been a subject of academic interest for a long time now, a 
huge part of it was focused on Western developed markets such as the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom or Germany. The lack of research on emerging economics 
is evident and can be attributed to many different factors, from lesser level of development 
of the markets and smaller base of M&A deals that could lie in the foundation of the 
research, to lower availability of data from these markets. However, recently, the largest 
developing economies that show the fastest growth, such as India and China, have become 
a more popular subject for the research (Gomes E. , Angwin, Peter, & Mellahi, 2012).  
One approach to analysing M&A practices in developing markets is comparing them to 
that of the developed countries. Lin, Peng, Yang & Sun (2009) compare firms’ M&A 
activities in the U.S. and China and come to the conclusion that while in both countries 
learning and network factors are extremely important in the M&A, differences in the 
market-based institutions between two countries lead to massive variety in effects that 
these factors have on the M&A activity. 




Kumar & Bansal (2008) in their research on the Indian M&A activities and their influence 
on the corporate performance, seem to support the comparative approach, pointing out 
differences in legislation that can also have an effect on the consequences of M&A in 
different countries. It is important to note that this research, while being quite simplistic 
in nature, is relatively new, which means that even the largest developing markets, such 
as India, seem to have been very unpopular with research in academia until very recently.  
Risk management becomes an increasingly important topic for M&A when it comes to 
developing markets. In a less stable, more volatile economies mergers and acquisitions 
can be not only means for growth, but also defence mechanisms for companies to mitigate 
risks, such as default or liquidity risk. In developing markets, such as Nigeria, many 
companies exist that could certainly benefit from a merger, it would allow them to attract 
investors and improve their financial health immensely, which is even more critical in the 
volatile economy (Agundu & Karibo, 1999). 
Analysing M&A activity in the developing markets can be particularly interesting due to 
more common crises in these economies. It is always important to look at the performance 
of firms not only in the calm environment of moderate growth and decline that it a typical 
business cycle, but also in the times of distress. Anandan, Kumar, Kumra and Padhi 
(1998) analysed the M&A activity in Asia and the influence of the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis on it. They found that despite an extreme fallout of the East Asian economies, 
between August and December 1997, in the very middle of the storm, more than 400 
M&A deals worth in total more than $35 billion were finalized in Asian developing 
markets. This was more than thrice the amount that Asian markets showed for the same 
period the year before. They attribute this to five key factors: easing of regulations, 
restructuring of family-owned conglomerates, sale of state-owned companies, 
overcapacity and deregulation of fragmented industries. Some of these factors could be 
extremely important in the analysis of the history of M&A in Russia. For instance, with 
the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia transferred from the planned economy 
of communism to the market economy, which meant that thousands of government-
owned companies were going to be sold to private owners. Easing of regulations is 
another key issue, as policy makers of the new Russian economy had to develop these 
regulations from scratch, which is a different story, but a related topic.  




Easing of regulations in Asia that used to be quite strict in most countries of the region 
allowed for an inflow of foreign capital. Prior to that many Western investors were 
disappointed not only by the instability of the region, but also by restriction put on the 
percentage of the stake that they were allowed to hold in South Korean, Indonesian, Thai 
and other companies in the region. By 1999, the government of Thailand allowed foreign 
investors to be majority stakeholders in Thai companies, South Korea raised the 
ownership ceiling from 29% to 55%, and Indonesia to 49% (Anandan, Kumar, Kumra, & 
Padhi, 1998).  
In the case of state-owned enterprises, as of 1996, they accounted for 70% of the Chinese 
economy, 50% in India, 45% in Thailand, 40% in Malaysia and 15-20% in South Korea. 
The amount of opportunities for the acquisition of these assets by privately owned 
enterprises was immense. It was seen as both a mean to raising funds for the government, 
as well as a way to raise the performance, since state-owned companies were proving to 
perform underwhelmingly. In China, for instance, up to 40% of state-owned enterprises 
were said to be losing money, while in India that estimate was around 50% (Anandan, 
Kumar, Kumra, & Padhi, 1998). 
Deregulation of fragmented industries was also crucial. Since, for instance, the average 
paper company in China had the size of about 6-7% of a typical U.S. paper company, the 
potential for merger was extremely high in case of deregulation. As Anandan et al. (1998) 
put it, “the message was clear: merge or die.” 
To sum up, the emerging markets have additional opportunities for successful M&A 
activity that developed countries don’t. They lie in low operating efficiency of state-
owned companies and extreme fragmentation of the industries that does not allow to 
exploit the economies of scale and economies of scope. 
2.3 Analysing the economic environment and specifics of M&A activities in Russia 
Research of academic literature dedicated to M&A activities in Russia shows that this 
developing economy, one of the largest in the world, is clearly underresearched by the 
academic community, especially when it comes to the articles in English that are 
published in leading financial and management journals. This revelation clearly shows a 
lot of potential and room for research.  




Despite the shortage of literature on M&A in Russia, articles on some related topics, such 
as impact of national culture on the business sphere, comparison of organizational culture 
in the U.S. and Russia, and others were still relevant for the research. In terms of culture, 
Russia has always been somewhere in the middle between the West and the East, but 
most researchers tend to attribute Western qualities to Russia in a stronger fashion than 
Eastern. Ralston, Holt, Terpstra and Kai-Cheng (2008) provide a framework, in which 
countries are divided by two dimensions: ideology (socialism vs. capitalism) and culture 
(Western vs. Eastern) and place Russia in the third quadrant that refers to the Western 
culture and socialist ideology, as opposed to the U.S. (Western capitalism), Japan (Eastern 
capitalism) and China (eastern socialism). However, authors note that Russia at the time 
of the research was struggling with ideological transitioning. Ten years later it can be 
claimed that this statement still holds true. Russia can be characterized as having a 
collectivistic-oriented business ideology, which makes it different from the United States, 
but mixed with an individualistic-oriented national culture, which contrasts Russia with 
China. This unique combination of values should definitely have its reflection in the 
M&A activities and the influence of different success factors on the performance of the 
companies. Both Russia and China are also countries that are clearly on their way of 
transitioning to the capitalistic model, and while at first glance Russia is clearly ahead in 
this race, this question is far more complicated than it seems. But this transitioning shows 
clear great potential for M&A activity in Russia. 
Cultural differences in the business sphere between Russia, the United States of America, 
China and Japan are reflected, for instance, in the demographic data on managers in these 
countries (Ralston, Holt, Terpstra, & Kai-Cheng, 2008). In a sample of 855 managers 
(about 200 from each country), it can be seen that managers in Russia are more 
predominantly male (68%) than in the U.S. (58%), but less than in China (75%) or 
extremely male-dominated, due to cultural features, Japan (98%). They also have the 
lowest experience among four countries, which can be explained by the fact that Russian 
market economy and the notion of manager as a profession is extremely new. 
Fey and Denison (2003) provide a quite extensive analysis of Russian management 
practices. Highlighting the troubles that transitioning Russian economy had, they note 
that these problems stem from the Soviet legacy, which manifests in managers being 




punished for negative outcomes, even when they are not to blame. This created a severe 
desire to showcase helplessness, put the blame on someone else, which is very typical of 
Russian mentality in general, and management practices as a shining example (de Vries 
& Manfred, 2000). Lack of accountability, on one hands, slows down the economic 
progress extremely, however, it also means that there is a lot of room for improvement, 
when the new generation of managers takes the leading positions. HRM practices, which 
are often a great indicator of cultural peculiarities, in Russia are defined by the fact that 
bonuses and additional incentives should be connected to initiative and individual 
accountability in order to defeat the willingness to make someone else make all the 
decisions for you, that lies deeply in the subconscious of most Russians, including 
managers and mere employees (Puffer & Shekshnia, 1996). What is also important, 
Russian workers are extremely inspired and motivated by opportunities to develop and 
learn (Fey & Bjorkman, 2001).  
Lawrence & Vlachoutsicos (1990) emphasizes another characteristic trait of doing 
business in Russia: poor flow of information. It especially applies to horizontal flow of 
information, which can be explained by viewing information as a source of power, which 
is also attributed to the legacy of the Soviet Union, as well as high level of distrust towards 
peers that is common for Russian people. Curiously enough, evidence shows that 
Russians, nevertheless, enjoy group work and are working a lot more effectively, while 
doing so (Puffer S. M., The Russian Management Revolution: Preparing Managers for 
the Market Economy, 1992). This also has huge implications in developing integration 
strategies for M&A deals in Russia. 
Closely related to the topic of M&A always stands the topic of strategic alliances. In a 
comparative analysis of two of the largest transitional economics, Russia and China, Hitt, 
Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas and Svobodina (2004) claim that due to China’s more 
supportive and stable business environment, during the process of partner selection for 
strategic alliances, companies can afford focusing more on the intangible assets that a 
company has, and think about long-term synergies, whereas in Russia, which has a more 
volatile business environment, managers tend to have a more short-term focus and select 
partners that can provide sufficient amount of capital immediately. Same logic could 
obviously be applied to M&A. With time we should expect a shift in the logic of Russian 




managers toward long-term synergies and intangible assets as Russian economy stabilizes 
and grows.  
It is impossible to analyse the dynamics of M&A in Russia without looking at the 
historical perspective. Early transition from centrally planned economy to the market 
economy in Russia is characterized by mistakes made by policy makers that 
underestimated complexities of the transitioning (Seliger, 2004). There is a lot of 
evidence that suggests that good governance at the state level finds its reflection in the 
economic prosperity of the country (Shleifer, 1997).  
Another key characteristic of Russian economic environment is high level of corruption 
(Venard, 2009). It is extremely important to keep that in mind while analysing cases of 
M&A activities in Russia. Russian government has such great influence on its economy, 
and especially on the oil & gas and banking industries, that corruption on the higher levels 
can be one of the most critical, defining aspects to the M&A activities that happened and 
are happening in modern Russia. Gidadhubli (2003) in his work, analysing connections 
between Russian oil industry and the state essentially predicted the conflicts between the 
government and the “oil barons”. While Russia went through the privatisation process 
after the fall of the Soviet Union, the relatedness of the business and the government is 
still too high not to play the role. As the author puts it, “notwithstanding the privatisation 
process, there are close relations and interactions between the state and private 
companies”. The largest private oil company in Russia, Lukoil, since its inception was 
led by Vagit Alekperov, who is a former deputy of the oil & gas industry of the USSR, 
and that is just one example of how intertwined the natural resources industries and the 
government were in Russia in the beginning of the 1990s, and they still are.  
Despite all the unattractive traits that Russian economy had in the 1990s, even then there 
was evidence that it is a lot more attractive for foreign investments than it seemed. Shama 
& Shama (1997) very accurately noted that “in Russia, what you see is not what you get” 
and that “Russia’s true economy may be twice as large as officially reported, because 
private-sector companies, which constitute more than half of Russia’s economy, do not 
report 90 percent of their revenues and profits.” According to authors, foreign investors’ 
view of Russia was mostly based on the little information that was available to them, 
which included incredibly skewed official data from Goskomstat, Russian official 




statistics bureau; personal subjective perceptions of the country, often overshadowed by 
stereotypes, and sometimes even pure gut feeling. In the meantime, Russian informal 
economy was estimated at 23% of GDP in 1988, before the Soviet Union fell apart 
(Grossman, 1993). One could only imagine what the number was by 1992, when the 
whole new type of economy emerged in the country, everyone was free to open their own 
business if they could afford it, and avoiding formal reporting of your true profits was 
still fairly easy due to lack of legal and financial institutions established. In addition to 
the fact that tax collection procedures were not properly established, tax rates were quite 
high in the beginning of 1990s, which also encouraged tax evasion (Economist, 1994).  
Not all preservations that foreign investors had about investing in Russian economy had 
no base to them, however. The scale of organized crime in Russia in the 1990s was 
immense. Abandoning the socialist paradigm without providing a concrete alternative, as 
already mentioned, created a vacuum in many spheres. It also provided fertile ground for 
prosperity of organized crime (Gaekwad, 1999). While “powerful politicians and 
bureaucrats took control of economic enterprises”, “there was uncontrolled parallel 
economy and organized crime took hold and spread. Embezzlement, murder, drug 
trafficking and arms smuggling have become a part of life in Russia.” It was roughly 
estimated that from 1990 to 1996, Russian businessmen and fake companies accumulated 
about $800 billion in offshore savings in Switzerland.  
Shama & Shama (1997) claim that the best way to evaluate and analyse Russian economy 
of the time was qualitative research, most importantly interviewing Russian businessmen 
behind closed doors. What is interesting is that even today a lot of Russian economics are 
still happening in the shadows, so this advice for other researchers is relevant until this 
day and should be noted by every economist who would like to do research on economic 
activity in Russia, including the mergers and acquisitions analysis. All the most 
interesting action is happening behind the scenes and qualitative primary data collected 
from interview in Russia can be extremely valuable for representatives of the academic 
community. 
The technique for obtaining sensitive qualitative data included a strict plan of the 
interview which led Russian business managers from the general questions to more 
specific and sensitive in nature. The results of these interview were astonishing: despite 




official reports about the decline of Russian economy by 15% annually, nine out of ten 
managers that were interview said that their business grew by anywhere in the range from 
15% to 250% (Shama & Shama, 1997).  
In his analysis of Russian economy post-1998 crisis, Robinson (2009) calls it “political 
economy”, which perfectly describes the level of significance Russian politics and 
Russian politicians always played in the economy. Results of the financial crisis of 1998 
in Russia were quite atypical and surprising: it was immediately followed by growth 
instead of recession and the role of foreign economic agencies in Russian economy did 
not increase. The key reason for that was, of course, increasing price of oil, the most 
precious and important resource that Russia has. Implications of the crisis, as Robinson 
puts is, were “mostly political”, but, as already mentioned, in Russia economics and 
politics cannot be separated at all. 1998, in hindsight, proved to be the point where the 
future track of Russia could be foreshadowed already: the “resource curse” and lack of 
foreign capital inflow to the economy. Russian economy tied itself tightly to the oil prices 
and twenty years later still cannot untie itself and does not seem to be willing to do so, 
even when prices dropped dramatically, quite possible because it doesn’t know how to 
do that anymore. 
Still, the results of the crisis were surprising. For comparison, in non-transitional 
emerging markets, a banking crisis usually depresses growth by one percentage point in 
the year following the crisis, and three points the year after that (Eichengreen & Rose, 
1998). Moreover, usually crises tend to force higher openness of the economy to the 
external intervention (Robertson, 2008). In Russia, however, after a 5% decline in the 
year of crisis, GDP bounced back by 6% the year after and continued to grow by about 
7% on average in the next eight years (Robinson, 2009). The reason for that is actually 
quite interesting, and it is an extremely indicative example of how the Soviet legacy found 
continuity in the post-Soviet Russian economy. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian 
economy became demonetized. Money substitutes and barter were commonplace, which, 
on one hand, let to the financial crisis. But on the other, since a huge part of Russian 
economy was not even based on money, financial crisis could not really do it much harm, 
which is why Russian economy bounced back so quickly. To exemplify, by 1997, barter 
accounted for 40%  of all industrial sales in Russia, promissory notes had a total worth of 




about 65% of the ruble M2, in some regions non-monetary instruments amounted to 40% 
of budgetary expenditures (OECD, 1997).  
This is one of those peculiar cases where crisis actually spurred growth. Decline of the 
economy during the crisis led to decrease in the volume of barter and monetary 
substitutes. After the crisis was over, this void was filled with money, which helped to 
boost Russian economy. This, in combination with growing oil prices led to the stable 
healthy growth of the economy in the following decade until the global financial crisis of 
2008. However, Russia missed out on the opportunity of becoming more open and 
welcoming to the foreign investment and inflow of the capital into the country. Until this 
day lack of capital investments is one of the key problems of the Russian economy and 
all of it is rooted in the 1990s. 
Puffer and McCarthy (2011) provide a comprehensive examination of management 
practices in Russia over the first two decades of its existence. They seem to support the 
idea that there was significantly less research dedicated to Russia than other BRIC 
countries. Their argument boils down to the fact that “Russian managers have relied 
excessively on informal institutions, including personal networks, to conduct business 
due to the void created by the weak legitimacy of the country's formal institutions.” While 
that might be fine for the first years during the transformation, an argument can be made 
that if Russian managerial force continues to govern companies in such a way, Russia 
will never become a completely integrated part of the global economy (Hitt, Ahlstrom, 
Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004; Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006).  
Russia definitely deserves the attention of researchers as its average household disposable 
income is 30% higher than in Brazil, 4 times higher than in China and 10 times higher 
than in India. For their analysis, Puffer and McCarthy (2011) created a three-part model 
that includes the environment, the business organization, and the mechanisms that are 
bridging the two. As already mentioned, weak legitimacy of formal institutions is one of 
the key characteristics of the Russian economy, which leads to Russian managers relying 
on informal institutions that are heavily influenced by the national culture (Scott, 2008).  
Influence of the government on the economy in Russia increased immensely in 2000s 
with Vladimir Putin as president, and essentially the state is in itself a formal economic 




institution, and the only one that is really legitimate at that (McCarthy, Puffer, & Naumov, 
2000). It was almost necessary after the 1990s, when after the privatization process came 
into full forces, oligarchs who owned the largest companies in the country, due to Russian 
peculiar economics-politics dynamic, became de-facto the rulers of the country. In a war 
with each other for the assets they destroyed the infrastructure that was left after the 
centrally planned communist economy (Shama & Sementsov, 1992), which created a lot 
of difficulties for managers to deal with (Wright, Hoskisson, Filatotchev, & Buck, 1998). 
Russian privatization process is universally deemed an extreme failure that harmed the 
transitioning to the market economy in many ways, since it essentially ruined the concept 
of property rights (Ellerman, 2002).  
Russian informal institutions are built around the notion of trust, it is deemed extremely 
important, but at the same time Russians tend to have very low general trust towards 
people they don’t know well (Hendley, Murrell, & Ryterman, 2000). This creates 
additional barriers for the growth of Russian businesses, especially through mergers and 
acquisition. There is evidence that his trait of character actually undermined negotiations 
with Western partners (Ayios, 2004) and required significant sacrifices of time that had 
to be spent on building this trust (Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 2005). While some Russian 
companies attempted to implement and showcase good management practices, it is clear 
that, in most companies, management still relies on informal institutions and that slows 
the development of Russian economy significantly. There is evidence, for instance, of 
managers using their networks to put their trusted associates into the Board of Directors 
to establish connections with the government that are so crucial in Russian business 
environment (Melkumov, 2009).  
Due to the fact that formal institutions have weak legitimacy in Russia, corporate 
governance of privatized companies and startups also relies on networks, trust and other 
informal institutions. Some of the results of such corporate culture include complete 
disregard to the needs of minority shareholders, lack of transparency in company’s 
performance, and board of directors that consists of friends, rather than competent people 
who are professional enough for this and can make the decisions objectively, people who 
are able to criticize each other. Puffer and McCarthy (2011) also mention that research 
on the topic of corporate governance in Russia is often too narrow and employs too much 




empirical methods, while broader range of topics should be taking into account when 
analysing corporate governance in Russian companies. That actually applies to all 
research on Russian economy. Due to the lack of good data and peculiar business 
environment in Russia, it would be extremely useful and important to conduct as much 
research with qualitative methods as possible. It allows for better, deeper understanding 
of the underlying issues, it helps researchers to get to the core of the problem, to the real 
reason why Russian business environment is so peculiar. Authors themselves say that 
“the record of corporate governance in Russia has generally been very poor”, which, 
unfortunately, does not allow for a good research based on secondary data, especially 
numerical data. 
Strategic choices of Russian managers are extremely limited due to poor implementation 
of the privatization program, as well as dominance of informal institutions in corporate 
culture. Corruption being commonplace in Russia, for instance, is not a cause, it is a 
result, it is the only way for managers to deal with the chaotic business environment that 
surrounds them and their company. Same applies to the commonplace use of networks 
that is described by Russian term blat. Since a substantial amount of money is spent on 
bribes, the company becomes limited in its resources that could be used for production, 
spent on marketing or research and development (R&D). This leads to differences in 
decision making on almost every aspect of management between Russian and, for 
instance, U.S. companies, from strategic planning to human resource management.  
Puffer and McCarthy also support the hypothesis that Russian managers are more focused 
on the short-term results due to both the cultural background and a hostile, volatile 
business environment. But what is even more important, they acknowledge the movement 
of Russian management practices towards the right direction, claiming that “as the first 
decade of the new millennium progressed, Russian managers moved beyond survival 
strategies to those that focused more on achieving growth in a highly uncertain 
environment”. 
Among potential forces that could bring change to management practices in Russia, 
leadership and knowledge management are named first and foremost since they usually 
tend to lead to more transparent corporate governance, usage of more competitive 
business strategies and implementation of clearer practices that are based around formal 




institutions. The problem here lies in the fact that perception of the concept of leadership 
in Russia is skewed due to its Soviet past. A leader for Russian people is someone who is 
authoritarian, or maybe even behaves like a dictator. However, that is not the leadership 
that a modern corporation needs. Evidence suggests that most Russian business leaders 
prefer the authoritarian style of governing, distancing themselves from the employees 
(Elenkov, 2002). However, recently more and more Russian employees voice their 
concerns about that and claim that they would prefer working under a more democratic 
regime in the workplace. 
To sum up, Russian historical and cultural background makes it a unique country with a 
very specific dynamic between the government and the businesses, as well as peculiar 
practices and traditions in management that do not allow it to become a complete member 
of the global economy and do not encourage the inflow of foreign capital into the country. 
In addition to that, even domestic alliances and M&A deals are hindered by the high level 
of general distrust that is characteristic to Russian managers, just like it is to all Russian 
people. 
All this knowledge accumulated on topics of M&A success factors, specifics of M&A 
activity in emerging markets and Russian unique business environment and management 
practices should allow for better understanding of the history of M&A activities in Russia 
throughout its history. 
3 Methodology 
The research is conveyed in a form of a case study. The history of mergers and 
acquisitions finalized throughout the history of modern Russian Federation since its 
inception in 1991 until July 2017 is analyzed to get a better understanding of factors that 
are particularly crucial for M&A success in Russian business environment. For the oil & 
gas industry, an extensive map is created, showing the development of the competition in 
these industries, ways that companies were merging with time. Tables with the key 
information about the most important M&A deals in both markets are created. Such 
information includes participants of the deal, the time it was prepared and finalized, as 
well as the stake acquired and the valuation of the target firm. These tables allow for 




better systematization of the knowledge gathered on the deals that happened in Russian 
oil & gas and banking markets. For the same purpose, a table comparing key 
characteristics of M&A in oil & gas and banking industries in Russia is also created. All 
of the aforementioned tables can be found in the annex. 
The research presented in this study relies heavily on open sources of information, such 
as industry overviews prepared by consulting companies, news and magazine articles, 
interviews with top management of the companies that participated in the deals analyzed 
in the research. This approach was chosen due to very constrained and limited access to 
databases, as well as lack of personal connections of the author in the business sphere, 
that would allow to conduct interviews and create a detailed case study of just one or 
several companies and deals. Sources used in this case study include the most respected 
Russian business media, such as Forbes Russia, Vedomosti, Kommersant and RBK. These 
are the most reliable sources of information on Russian economy. All the sources provide 
information in Russian, translation of the data was done by the author.  
Oil & gas industry analysis considers 14 major oil & gas companies that emerged after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, and tracks the way they merged into six existing major 
players in the market. Banking industry analysis focuses on the most important mergers 
and acquisitions that happened in the history of Russia and analyzes them from the 
perspective of frameworks provided in the related literature. 
Comparative analysis of the cases of two industries is later conducted to establish peculiar 
characteristics of the M&A activity in each of the industries. All the findings are 
attempted to be explained through the existing models and frameworks listed in section 
2. Appropriate frameworks are selected and applied in order to achieve better 
understanding of business processes in Russia and emphasize factors that are especially 
important for the success of the M&A activities in Russian business environment, taking 
into account unique cultural features.  
 
 





4.1.Oil & Gas industry 
Russian economy is often considered to be “oil-addicted”, depending too heavily on the 
price of such natural resources as oil and gas. This makes oil & gas industry, quite 
possibly, the most important for modern Russian economy. As of 2017, Russian oil & gas 
market has six major players: Rosneft, Gazprom, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, Tatneft and 
Russneft. However, previously the market was a lot more fragmented, it has a long history 
of mergers and acquisitions (see Figures 1 and 2).  
The 1990s started with the fallout of the Soviet Union and emergency of a new country: 
Russian Federation. Transitioning from the centrally planned economy to the market 
economy resulted in emergency of state-owned companies based on the oil & gas 
enterprises that the Soviet Union had. The first half of the decade was characterized by 
the emergence of oil & gas companies, some of which remained state-owned to different 
extent, and some were sold at auctions to private investors. Some of the companies that 
emerged at that time include Gazprom (formed in 1989), Lukoil (1991), Surgutneftegaz 
and ill-fated Yukos (1992), Tatneft, SIDANKO, ONAKO, VNK and Slavneft (1994), 
YUNKO, TNK and Sibneft (1995).  
Middle of the 90s is often considered as an era of ruling oligarchs in Russia. For the oil 
& gas industry this meant constant trading deals on minority stakes in those companies 
that were privatized, but no M&A activity was happening at the time. The first significant 
deal happened in 1997, when Yukos acquired 45% of VNK’s shares, which, in addition 
to 9% already owned by Yukos gave the company control over VNK’s assets. Yukos paid 
4.8 trillion rubles, which means that VNK was evaluated at 10.6 trillion rubles. This deal 
will later receive an extremely notorious status and will become a part of the infamous 
lawsuit against Yukos’ CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Reznik & Myazina, 2010). 
In 1998, Russian oil & gas industry could be shaken for the first time by an extremely 
large M&A deal: a merger between Yukos and Sibneft, which would have made a merged 
company the owner of the largest proven oil reserves in the world. However, this deal 
never happened, since the primary goal of the deal was to privatize Rosneft later, but 
Yukos and Sibneft management lost interest after oil prices crashed (Kommersant.ru, 




2001). Urals brand oil prices at the time were at their lowest point in a decade, lower than 
$10 per barrel. Motivation for potential M&A deals at the time was quite simple and not 
very strategic: due to the newly emerged economy, financial crises coming wave after 
wave, the conjuncture of the Russian oil & gas market could mostly be defined by the 
expression “survival of the fittest”. Companies that were in the hardest financial distress 
were being acquired piece by piece by those who had sufficient capital, without any 
integration strategy thought through, it was an acquisition of tangible assets: oil reserves, 
machinery, territories, but certainly not intangible assets and know-how.  
In the beginning of the new millennium, TNK became a major player in the market and 
started the M&A activity in the industry with three huge deals in three years. In 2000, it 
acquired 50% plus one share of ONAKO for $1.08 billion. In 2001, TNK acquired 
SIDANKO, which was already going through the bankruptcy procedure at this point. 
Finally, in 2002, Slavneft was split evenly between TNK and Sibneft, two companies paid 
$1.86 billion in total.  
2003 was marked for the Russian oil & gas industry by the largest deal up to date. British 
oil company BP offered TNK to create a joint venture called TNK-BP. TNK was 
terminated, all its assets became a part of TNK-BP which was owned by old TNK 
shareholders and BP equally.  
Around the same time, legal lawsuits against Yukos emerged. Eventually they led to the 
bankruptcy of the company, and in 2004 it was acquired by the state-owned Rosneft. 
Since Yukos assets were arrested by the government, the state-owned Rosneft was able 
to buy them out at an extreme discount. That is not the only case of such an acquisition, 
in fact, acquisitions at a large discount due to either the arrest of assets by the government 
or the bankruptcy of the target were quite common for the industry and for Russian 
economy of that time in general. This fact may explain why post-merger integration was 
so weak. When the acquisition is done at a large discount, the management of the acquirer 
has no incentives for the realization of synergies, shareholder’s value creation happens 
on its own, simply from the cheap acquisition.  
The case of Yukos is still considered one of the largest economic and political stories in 
the history of modern Russia. Events surrounding Yukos bankruptcy and sentences to 




Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev shaped both Russian economy and politics 
of that time. It was a turning point for the Russian oil & gas industry that symbolized 
emergence of state-owned giants and further consolidation of assets due to the 
government’s increased involvement in the country’s economics, which Putin deemed 
necessary due to the fact that weak government of Boris Yeltsin let oligarchs to take the 
power into their own hands. 
In 2005, Gazprom entered the oil business, acquiring 72.6% of Sibneft’s shares from 
Roman Abramovich’s Millhouse Capital for $13.091 billion and renaming it into 
Gazpromneft (Lenta.ru, 2005). This insanely huge deal became the final sign of the new 
era. After this deal, Russian oil & gas M&A activity was basically non-existent on a large 
level for eight years.  
In 2013 Rosneft announced the largest deal in the history of Russian oil & gas industry. 
It acquired 100% of TNK-BP, evaluated at more than $55 billion. BP was paid both with 
cash and Rosneft’s shares, getting a 19.75% stake in Rosneft after the deal (RBK, 2013). 
This deal was preceded by heavy involvement of government, as always. In 2011, BP 
CEO Bob Dudley and Rosneft’s president Igor Sechin, who is often called a “de-facto 
deputy of Vladimir Putin” (The Guardian, 2017) signed a global strategic alliance 
agreement in the presence of the president Vladimir Putin himself. This agreement sealed 
the deal in which Rosneft exchanged 9.5% of its shares for 5% of BP’s shares. This 
contradicted the exclusive agreement between BP and TNK that did not allow BP to 
collaborate with any other Russian oil company in the Russian oil market (Todorova, 
2016). TNK-BP CEO, Mikhail Fridman, sued BP and Rosneft, and the deal was denied. 
However, this ruined the relationships between BP and TNK-BP management that 
already had lost of tension in them. BP wanted out of the joint venture with TNK, and 
since contacts with Rosneft were already established, finding the acquirer was not 
complicated.  
Rosneft and TNK-BP merger is the only huge merger in the Russian oil & gas industry 
that happened recently, but at the same time enough time passed for some data to be 
obtained to estimate the performance of the merger. Prior to the merger, in 2012, TNK-
BP had EBITDA of $13.3 billion, Rosneft had EBITDA of $4.6 billion. In 2014, most-
merger, Rosneft showed EBITDA of $4 billion. Revenue of Rosneft in 2012 and 2014 




was almost the same, although TNK-BP had a revenue 2 and a half times higher than 
Rosneft prior to the merger (Todorova, 2016). Certainly, to some extent these 
underwhelming results could be attributed to the fluctuations in the oil prices and the 
exchange rate of ruble. However, since the results are so dramatic, one could claim that 
the lack of commitment to the integration process and lack of leadership in Rosneft’s 
management also played its role. 
The latest large M&A deal in Russian oil & gas industry happened in 2016, when Rosneft 
bought 50% plus one share of Bashneft, which quickly became one of the most scandalous 
deals in the history. The controlling stake in Bashneft belonged to JSFC Sistema since 
2005. However, in 2014 the owner of JSFC Sistema, Vladimir Evtushenkov, was accused 
of money laundering and Bashneft’s assets were arrested and deprivatized. When Rosneft 
acquired 50% of Bashneft for 330 billion rubles (around $5 billion), it was essentially one 
state-owned company acquiring another. Rosneft’s press secretary, Mikhail Leontiev, did 
not try to hide the truth: “All money will go to the budget. We just needed to add money 
to the budget quickly, that is one way.” (RBK, 2016) This is yet another case of Rosneft’s 
acquisition of assets arrested by the government.  
Analysis of the oil & gas mergers and acquisitions in Russia allows us to make several 
conclusions. Firstly, and that is the most characteristic trait of the M&A conjuncture in 
Russia, a fairly segmented market that emerged after the privatization of oil deposits and 
oil refining facilities that belonged to the government was moving towards consolidation 
from the very beginning.  
Secondly, all the M&A deals were followed by the weak integration strategy, companies 
were growing larger by acquiring assets of companies that were on the verge of 
bankruptcy or with hostile acquisitions that were allowed by the government’s support. 
Usually the acquired companies were keeping their name and autonomy for a small period 
of time (three to five years), after that their assets were completely consumed by the 
acquirer. Acquisitions were usually followed with mass firings in order to optimize the 
cost structure. Specifics of the oil & gas industry allowed for weak interdependence and 
integration, since all oil wells and deposits function separately and often collaborate with 
oil refineries that are located nearby. This makes Russian oil & gas industry not very 
usable for analyzing integration strategies, however, this example is a great showcase of 




how mergers and acquisitions are conducted in a transitioning economy in a sector that 
relies on natural resources and heavy manufacturing.  
Thirdly, it is quite interesting that during the history of Russian oil & gas market, no 
foreign company ever acquired a Russian company, and only BP risked creating a joint 
venture with TNK. Other companies, such as Exxon, entered Russia by themselves, 
exploring, extracting and refining oil using their own resources. In addition to completely 
understandable caution due to political risks, it seems that Western oil companies do not 
believe that the cultural gap between the West and Russia can be overcome in the 
integration process. The fallout that happened between the management of TNK and 
management of BP only supports that hypothesis. The lack of communication was 
worsened by geopolitical tensions between Russia and the Western world, which led to 
BP wanting out of managing its venture in Russia. Currently BP exists in Russia purely 
as a brand. 
To summarize, the analysis of the oil & gas industry in Russia show that motives for 
mergers and acquisitions in Russia often have less to do with corporate strategy and 
business, and more with political ambitions of the top management of the state-owned oil 
companies.  
4.2 Banking Industry 
Banking industry in Russia, obviously, is represented by a lot more companies than the 
oil & gas industry. It has to be noted, that even without analyzing particular cases, by 
looking at mere numbers, it becomes clear that Russian banking industry was also a 
subject to consolidation, which is to be expected. After the fall of the Soviet Union, 
thousands of small financial organizations were trying to fill the vacuum and satisfy the 
demand for financial services. Poor management decisions, financial crises and simple 
natural selection led to extinction of the larger part of those banks. In 1997, there were 
2007 banks in Russia, by 2009 that number decreased to 1041 (Central Bank of Russia, 
2017). In recent years, the Central Bank of Russia was using desperate measure to 
increase financial health of Russian banking system, which led to further shutdowns and 
acquisitions of poorly performing banks. As of October 5, 2016, there are about 600 
functioning banks in Russia. 




Ten largest Russian banks include: Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, FC Otkritie, VTB 24, 
Rosselhozbank, Alpha-Bank, Bank of Moscow, National Clearing Center, and UniCredit. 
It is important to note that banking industry was historically vastly different from the oil 
& gas industry in terms of the M&A activity, since there was no large deal including two 
Russian banks. On the contrary, foreign banks were extremely interested in expanding 
into the Russian market and many of them have chosen the strategy of expansion through 
acquisitions.  
The M&A activity in the banking industry in Russia became noticeably intense after the 
economy recovered from the banking crisis of 1998, around 2000. Prior to the crisis, the 
market was extremely segment and the presence of foreign capital was minimal. This was 
caused by poor investment climate, specific Russian management practices and lack of 
cultural fit, but also due to the policy of the Central Bank of Russia that was determined 
to keep control over the national banking system. This position was and still is supported 
by the major Russian banks. Nevertheless, several foreign banks that were focused on 
Eastern European markets were still working in Russia at the time, including HVB, Bank 
Austria and Raiffeisen Bank. The only notable M&A deal that happened during that 
period was an acquisition of Bank Austria Creditanstalt by IMB. This was a part of a 
larger acquisition of Bank Austria my HVB, since IMB was HVB’s subsidiary. This deal 
was just a part of the consolidation process (Central Bank of Russia, 2017). 
During the golden period of Russian economy (2000-2006), the M&A activity increased 
and foreign financial institutions became increasingly willing to purchase assets of 
Russian banks, despite high economical and institutional barriers, illiquidity of Russian 
ruble, lack of Russian presence in WTO, weak regulation of the M&A activity in the 
banking industry and overall and some other factors. Moreover, if prior to 2003-2004, the 
only option of expansion that foreign banks had was opening a subsidiary in Russia, 
starting from that time acquisitions of Russian banks finally became an option. Central 
Bank of Russia (2017) points out common patterns in these cross-border acquisitions that 
were taking place during that period.  
One of the characteristic traits of those deals was the fact that foreign banks were attracted 
to banks that were already owned by foreign agents, but smaller ones. Usually the number 
of such attractive banks was quite low, which meant constant high competition. In 




addition to that, potential acquirers were focusing on mid-sized banks with particular 
specialization, be it retail, corporate or investment banking. Investors were interested in 
banks that already had a strong established position in a specific segment of the market. 
The period of 2003-2004 was a preliminary stage of some sort, during which foreign 
banks were mostly evaluating their options. One notable M&A deal from that period of 
time was the acquisition of Delta-bank by the financial services subsidiary of General 
Electric, GE Consumer Finance (see Figure 3). It was the first major acquisition of a 
Russian-owned bank by a foreign company. The deal was estimated at about $100 million 
(Banki.ru, 2006).  
Meanwhile, largest world banks were fighting for the best pieces available in the Russian 
market. For instance, KMB-Bank attracted attention of Banca Intesa (Italy), Deutsche 
Bank (Germany) and BNP Paribas (France) all at once. The acquisition of 45% of Russkiy 
Standard Bank by Cetelem, a subsidiary of BNP Paribas was almost finalized, but at the 
last moment the owners increased the price and the deal got called off. This move by the 
owners of Russkiy Standard was justified, as the Russian economy was growing and 
stabilizing, Russian commercial banks were becoming increasingly attractive and 
expensive.  
The period of 2005-2006 was characterized by a more open interest of foreign capital in 
Russian banks, and not just mid-sized ones, major banks too. Societe Generale (France) 
acquired a 20% plus one share stake in Rosbank with an option of expanding the 
ownership to the controlling stake. Later, in 2008, the French bank would proceed to 
acquire additional 30% of Rosbank, becoming the majority stakeholder. In total, Societe 
General paid $2.3 billion (Kommersant, 2008). There were also talks of acquisition of 
Gazprombank (financial subsidiary of Gazprom) by Dresdner Bank AG (Germany). The 
motives of such deals were clear: some foreign banks already trusted Russian economy 
and were willing to enter it and capture a significant market share immediately. In the 
mid-sized segment there were some important deals as well, for instance, two acquisitions 
of DeltaCredit and Promec-Bank by the aforementioned Societe Generale, as well as 
Raiffeisen International Bank-Holding acquiring Impeksbank and Banca Intesa acquiring 
KMB-Bank after winning the fight against Deutsche Bank and BNP Paribas (Banki.ru, 
2005). Banks that focused on such acquisitions were choosing a bit more cautious 




strategy, they were paying less for a lower market share, but they were entering a 
consumer banking segment that was growing rapidly as disposable income of Russians 
was growing steadily. Some banks, like Swedbank (Sweden) and ICICI (India) chose 
another path and acquired small banks in order to get a license from the Central Bank of 
Russia.  
From the beginning of 2005 to the beginning of 2007, due to this expansion, share of 
foreign capital in Russian financial institutions increased from 6.2% to almost 14.9% 
(Central Bank of Russia, 2017). Foreign banks were not just acquiring Russian banks; 
they were actively integrating them into the corporate structure. The most indicative part 
of that was that almost all of the banks were either immediately, or eventually terminating 
the old brand and managing the branches under the parent’s brand. In the middle of 2000s 
Russians could not help but notice how Russian bank names were disappearing from the 
streets, giving way to foreign-sounding brands. Other large deals included the acquisition 
of 75% of Orgresbank by Nordea (Scandinavia) for $313 million. 
All this M&A activity resulted in something that nobody would have believed in in the 
1990s: foreign bank groups emerged in Russia. Societe General acquired three banks and 
formed two subsidiaries: Bank Societe General Vostok and Rusfinance Bank. Banca 
Intesa, UniCredit and Raiffeisenbank also created bank groups in Russia.  
Large Russian banks were relatively passive in terms of the M&A activity compared to 
their foreign counterparts. The only relatively large deal that happened between two 
Russian banks at that time was the acquisition of 75% of PSB by VTB for $577 million 
(Kommersant, 2005).  
Foreign banks were not only attracted to the retail banking in Russia. In 2006, Deutsche 
Bank acquired an investment company United Financial Group for $700 million to 
establish the investment banking department in Russia (Deutsche Bank, 2017). That was 
the largest deal in the investment sector. At the same time, UniCredit acquired two 
departments of the investment group Aton: Aton Broker and Aton International Ltd. For 
$424 million.  
In the following years, two more large deals happened when Belgian KBC Group 
acquired 92.5% of Absolut Bank for $953 million, interrupting Absolut Bank’s 




preparation for the potential IPO, and when Barclays acquired Expobank for $745 million 
(Banki.ru, 2016). A few smaller deals occurred at the time, but the M&A boom in Russian 
banking sector ended at the same time as in most other countries and most other 
industries, in 2008 with the global financial crisis. 
After the global financial crisis of 2008, the M&A activity in Russian banking sector 
slowed down, just like the whole economy. However, in the new decade, as Russian 
economy found itself in distress due to fluctuations of oil prices, as well as geopolitical 
issues, many minor banks in Russia found themselves in a desperate situation. At the 
same time, some successful players, such as Binbank and Otrkitie took advantage of it 
and started rapid extension through cheap acquisitions of banks in distress. Otkritie 
quickly rose to power and became the fourth largest bank group in Russia through this 
strategy.  
It is clear that the case of the banking industry in Russia is extremely different from the 
oil & gas industry (see Figure 4). Due to much lesser involvement of government in the 
market, foreign banks were not as reluctant to acquire assets in Russia, as foreign oil & 
gas companies were. Another reason for such difference may lie in the size of potential 
targets: almost any acquisition in the oil & gas industry would have been at the valuation 
over $1 billion dollars, which is a sum too big to commit to such an unstable market as 
Russia. Mid-sized banks, on the other hand, could be acquired at the valuation of $100-
500 million (see Figures 2 and 3).  
While foreign banks were a lot more active in terms of M&A in Russian market than 
foreign oil & gas companies, the opposite is true about domestic companies. While big 
fish in the oil & gas industry was constantly trying to eat everyone who is at least a little 
bit smaller, large Russian banks were very passive and just one relatively big acquisition 
occurred. Reasons for that remain unclear, although one educated guess would be that 
most larger Russian banks are owned either by the Central Bank of Russia, like Sberbank, 
or by government structures, like VTB, and state-owned companies usually tend to 
showcase more passive behavior. The only large bank that was actively acquiring 
competitors was the privately-owned Otrkitie. 




Motivation for the M&A deals in two industries is extremely different. While in oil & gas 
industry companies were often acquiring bankrupt competitors just for their assets with a 
goal of further restructuring, which in result led to the ruling of a few giant firms, in the 
banking industry the main motive that was driving the M&A activity was growing 
attractiveness of Russian commercial and investment banking markets, which attracted 
lots of foreign investors, since huge Russian market was essentially just created and there 
was a lot of demand for financial services to suffice. Such huge markets emerge out of 
nowhere extremely rarely and everyone wanted a piece of it. 
The M&A boom in the banking industry in Russia happened in the middle of the 2000s, 
when Russian economy was at its healthiest state in all history of the country. Perhaps, 
foreign investors could show interest to Russian oil & gas companies in these 
circumstances as well, but by 2005 there was, essentially, no one left to buy, the segment 
already went through most of the consolidation it could go through and all the potential 
targets were too big for foreign investors.  
However, M&A activities in both industries also share something in common. Both are 
characterized by general movement in the direction from the higher number of players to 
the lower number through consolidation. The main reason why this holds true for both 
industries is that it is cause by the historical background of the country. After the Soviet 
Union fell apart and the new market economy started emerging, in attempts to satisfy the 
demand Russian businessmen oversaturated the market and it was returning to the state 
of balance. However, it has to be noted, that with time drivers of consolidations were 
extremely different. While in the banking industry banks started failing in 2010s due to 
complicated geopolitical situation and the following volatility of ruble exchange rate, as 
well as oil prices, in the oil & gas industry smaller players failed at the junction of two 
millennia, when Russian economy did not stand on two feet yet and oil prices were 
extremely low. Also, the business environment in the banking industry was a lot less 
hostile than in the oil & gas industry. 
 
 




5 Further research implications and practical significance 
The conducted research opens a path for further analysis of the Russian M&A market. 
Being a young market economy with less than 30 years of history, Russia is an extremely 
interesting and exciting subject for further research as M&A activity in the country is 
expected to grow as the economy grows and develops further and approaches the levels 
of the developed markets. The amount of research conducted on Russian M&A market is 
significantly lower than that of developed countries. Furthermore, a large part of the 
research that is present, is reported in Russian language, which creates a language barrier 
for various researchers from all over the world. This study aims to participate in an 
attempt to overcome this obstacle.  
As already mentioned, the research presented in this study is very limited due to lack of 
access to more private information on Russian M&A deals. There is a huge opportunity 
to go into a lot more detail for researchers with better access to those means of research. 
This research could be quantitative, there is a great need for better, more wholesome 
databases on M&A activity in Russia, and this data needs to be analyzed. It could also be 
qualitative, there are lots of extremely interesting, peculiar M&A cases that happened in 
Russia in past years, and a lot of important insights could be obtained from top 
management of the companies that participated in these deals. That is especially true since 
a big part of deals that happened in the Russian oil & gas industry happened under very 
questionable circumstances, so to understand the complete context it is extremely 
important to have primary information from the participants of the deal firsthand.   
The sample of mergers and acquisitions analyzed in this research, as well as the number 
of companies is relatively small. Thus, one obvious way of building upon this work is to 
analyze smaller companies and smaller deals and create a complete, exhaustive map of 
mergers and acquisitions in the aforementioned industries in Russia. It has to be noted 
that there is an evident lack of data, even when it comes to the bigger deals, which means 
that researchers, when going deeper, will have to rely on obtaining access to private 
sources of information, including primary sources, such as interview with participants of 
the deals that happened.  




Similar research could obviously be conducted for other industries of Russian economy. 
While oil & gas and banking are certainly two of the most crucial industries for Russia, 
which is why they were chosen as subjects of the research, there are several other 
industries that would be interesting to look at. Those include energy, metals, coal mining, 
and retail. 
Research on M&A activity often lies in a close proximity to psychology, since human 
factor is so important. M&A deals that happened in Russia both in 1990s and 2000s are 
so peculiar that human factor becomes even more important, the history of M&A in 
Russia is so full of strong characters that there is a huge potential for extremely interesting 
case studies on particular deals, such as Gazprom’s acquisition of Sibneft or TNK and 
Sibneft splitting Slavneft, which led to a lot of conflicts between shareholders of both 
companies. Russia has to be researched from the inside, that was already shown by many 
authors whose works are mentioned in the related literature review. That means that 
research that uses qualitative data is a lot more valuable in case of Russia, than research 
that utilizes quantitative methods, especially until good databases on Russian market 
appear. Same approach could be valuable in the research on banking industry as well, one 
of the potential topics for exploration could be the reasoning behind passive behavior of 
large Russian banks during the M&A boom compared to their foreign counterparts. 
Russia is one of the largest developing economies, which means that analysis of the M&A 
market in this country could be extremely important for understanding of specifics of 
M&A activity in developing markets. This could have a lot of implications, most notably, 
it could be used as know-how by companies in less developed markets that will move up 
the ladder of development level in the future, for instance, larger African or South 
American markets.  
The unique relationship dynamic between Russian companies, especially state-owned 
ones, and the government, can be extremely important to analyze for later application to 
other markets with a similarly high role of government, such as Turkey, Venezuela, etc. 
It seems pretty evidence that M&A activity in countries with such a relationship between 
the government and the business differs significantly from countries with low 
involvement of the government. This topic could be extended into comparative analysis, 
it would help establishing, whether government involvement always harms the success 




of the M&A deals, or there are cases in which it can have positive effects. Both companies 
and the government can learn something and make conclusions that would allow for 
better, smoother economic transition of young developing markets.  
Outside of the topic of mergers and acquisition, this case study is an interesting illustration 
of how the country’s historical and cultural background influences the economy and 
relationships of all the agents involved in the economy with a government. This topic 
could be further researched by an alliance of economists, psychologists, historians and 
representatives of other scientific disciplines. Russia is one of the youngest market 
economies in the world, which means that it is one of the few cases of a transitional 
economy that is going through the transition in the modern era, where scientists have a 
lot more ways to access data and a lot more data accumulated then, for instance, even 50 
years ago.  
It is hard to overstate the importance of Russian economy as a subject for economical 
case studies. Its unique culture and mentality of its people, its cultural and historical 
background allow for thorough, unique analysis, it is a gold mine for scientists to explore 
and expend the base of knowledge that humanity accumulated on the topic of history, 
economics and other social disciplines during its history.  
M&A activity in Russia, as this study shows, is closely related to corruption, one could 
claim that understanding the way corruption in Russia works is key to understanding the 
M&A processes in Russia. Since most of the research on M&A is focused on developing 
markets, there is a clear lack of research on how corruption influences the M&A 
conjuncture in the economy. Nevertheless, there are a lot of countries in the world with a 
level of corruption comparable or even higher than in Russia. Thus, researching the 
influence of corruption on M&A activities in Russia is another possible direction of 
research that could be taken so that other countries could learn from the experience of 
Russia. 
This study also showcases particular importance of research dedicated to comparison of 
M&A practices between different industries in one country. Controlling for peculiarities 
of the national culture would allow to explore better the specifics of the M&A processes 




in different industries and evaluate the attractiveness of a particular industry in a particular 
country for foreign investors. 
By the same token, it is important to provide comparative analysis of the M&A activity 
in the same industry between different countries, especially different countries with 
emerging economies. Better understanding of the influence of cultural differences 
between Russia, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea or any other emerging 
market would allow companies from these countries to obtain priceless knowledge and 
implement in in the M&A process in the future.  
Research also showed that sometimes financial crisis can lead to an increasing M&A 
activity as it leads to massive failure of companies that are later acquired cheaply by 
competitors. It would be interesting to look at the impact that financial crises have on the 
M&A activity in other emerging markets, as well as developed countries, since its effects 
are not as trivial as it may seem at first. 
It is also important to note that further research should look not only at the past, but also 
into the future. As Russian market becomes more developed and a new generation of 
managers takes control of Russian businesses, it would be interesting to compare newly 
introduced practice in the M&A activities to those of the past. It can be expected that in 
five to ten years Russian businesses would be more willing to participate in field 
experiments and other active methods of research. Best Western practices could be 
implemented in Russian companies with the help of economists and the results of this 
implementation would be extremely important for attempts to answer the question 
whether these practice can work for Russia, or its culture is too different for these 
practices to work. Next 20-30 years will be an extremely exciting period for Russian 
economy and academia has to use it to their advantage. The key question to be answered 
about Russia and its economy remains this: is it possible that old informal institutions are 
going to be exterminated from the managerial practices and replaced by solid formal 
institutions similar to those in the West? 
 
 





As shown by this research, Russian M&A activities are full of interesting cases worth 
analyzing. Compared to developed markets and other emerging economies, Russian 
market is defined by a set of peculiar characteristics. The purpose of this research was to 
start analyzing the differences Russian markets have with other emerging and developed 
markets, as well as the differences between M&A activities in different industries in 
Russia.  
The most important finding of the research was a striking difference between the climate 
that prevailed in the oil & gas industry and in the banking industry. It is a great illustration 
of the importance of both national cultural differences and organizational cultural 
differences, as well as the level of involvement of the government in the business 
processes of the major companies in the country in a particular industry. 
Firstly, and most importantly, a striking majority of all M&A deals that happened in 
Russia through its almost 30-year history happened in a holding or preservation style 
according to the framework provided by Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991). That means that 
in a transitioning economy that is not developed enough, companies do not have a lot of 
intangible assets accumulated over time, such as know-how or brand recognition, and the 
acquisition of the company is basically the same as acquisition of its material assets.  
Secondly, in a newly emerged market economy there was a clear vacuum of leadership, 
which, according to research, is one of the most important factors for the success of an 
M&A deal. The same lack of leadership led to the fact that so many companies were 
failing and Russian markets were consolidating through series of hostile takeovers. This 
also connects to the first trait, since there was no management to speak of in the target 
company, it could be easily acquired and no conflict of interest between two management 
teams arose.  
Thirdly, the lack of leadership mentioned earlier can also be explained by the legacy of 
Soviet Union, where severe punishments for failure led to people being afraid of taking 
initiative and responsibility. One could claim that the destinies of many Russian oligarchs 
that rose to power in the end of 1990s, such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky 
or Boris Berezovsky would create the same fear of taking initiative in a new, younger 




generation of managers and businessmen. This would be an interesting issue to tackle in 
further research.  
Fourthly, additional reason why post-merger integration is conducted with such 
carelessness in lots of Russian companies may have to do with the fact that many 
acquisitions are made at a huge discount due to the fact that many companies that are 
acquired are on the verge of bankruptcy. As Schweiger (2002) points out, if the merger is 
done at a large discount, there is no need for realization of the synergies for the creation 
of the acquirer shareholder’s value. 
Additional value of this research lies in the fact that the prevailing majority of data on 
Russian market, including mergers and acquisition, is in Russian. It is one of the reasons 
why Russia is such an overlooked region for research, and the importance of this study 
lies in author’s ability to collect data in Russian and then analyze it through frameworks 
that were developed by bright economic minds from all over the globe. Findings of this 
research should inspire and encourage researchers around the world to collaborate with 
Russian-speaking scientists in research on Russian business environment. Same holds 
true for other countries where native language is not widely-spread and there is a lack of 
data in English on the country. Collaborating with native speakers is always a good 
practice, since they often do not only provide access to additional data, they can also give 
insights that are only understandable for people who grew in the culture that is subject to 
the research.   
By analyzing the dynamics of oil & gas and banking industries in Russia we can come to 
a conclusion that this markets now have a lot less companies than in the beginning of the 
1990s. That is to be expected of any economy that is transitioning from centrally planned 
to market form. Many companies that arise to fill the void due to market powers, later fail 
due to poor management or financial turbulence that is also to be expected when the 
country experiences such a dramatic transition. Assets of failing companies are acquired 
cheaply by those who survive, making them bigger and stronger.  
Government’s extremely high involvement in the oil & gas industry together with high 
level of corruption on every level of Russian government and business pushed 
consolidation in the market even further, giving power to the few state-owned companies, 




such as Rosneft, or protecting private companies that are governed by people loyal to the 
government, like Lukoil. This result can have far-going implications for any country or 
industry, where government is heavily involved, especially if the level of corruption is 
high, and these two notions often go hand in hand.  
The case of TNK-BP and an overall lack of foreign investment in Russian oil & gas 
market show that the business world believes more in negative effects of cultural gaps on 
the success of mergers and acquisitions, rather than the positive ones. That is completely 
reasonable, however, further research on that subject may with time change the public 
perception of cultural gaps, if stronger evidence of positive effects is found.  
Another reason for lack of foreign investment in Russian oil & gas and banking industries 
was that half of Russian economy in 1990s existed in shadows for the Russian 
government, which meant that official reporting that was visible to foreign investors also 
did not showcase half of the Russian economy. This led investors to believe that Russia 
is a lot less attractive for invest in than it actually was. One could make a conclusion that 
this willingness to hide own revenues and profits from the government did not only come 
from purely opportunistic behavior, but also from the communist background, where 
businessmen that just managed to privatize a business were afraid that once they get 
successful, government is going to take it back after it grew under proper management. 
Taking into account the events of 2000s, it is hard to blame Russian businessmen of the 
1990s for thinking that. 
In addition to that, Russian management practices always relied heavily on informal 
institutions, such as culture and ethics, due to the fact that formal institutions were too 
weak and illegitimate after the fall of the Soviet Union. This means that unique 
characteristics of Russian mentality and national culture are reflected so heavily in the 
organizational culture, that it increases the cultural distance of Russian companies from 
their foreign counterparts to extreme levels, which makes potential cross-border mergers 
and following integration processes increasingly complex and complicated to conduct, 
and communication deficiencies between two management teams are more likely to occur 
in cross-border M&A deals including Russian companies. 




However, it can be seen that the experience of the banking industry was strikingly 
different. Possible explanation to this could lie in the fact that banking industry did not 
experience as much intervention from the government officials, as oil & gas industry did, 
it worked by different laws, closer to the Western management style. To explain the 
differences between two industries better, it would be interesting to look at the changes 
in management teams of Russian banks that were acquired by foreign investors. If 
Russian managers were kept at their positions, then the hypothesis about bad Russian 
management practices staying forever is false. 
The legacy of the Soviet Union can be tracked in many aspects of the M&A activity 
throughout Russian history. From the patterns in management to overall mentality of all 
the participating agents, from the overreaching hand of the government in the business 
activities to the suspicious looks on the business sphere in Russia from the West, 30 years 
later it still defines Russian economics. Russia today is a field experiment happening in 
real time that showcases what are the main obstacles in transitioning from a centrally 
planned economy to the market economy. Hopefully, Russian economy will learn on its 
own mistakes and other countries that are yet to begin the transformation could use this 
example to avoid falling into the same traps and take only the best of practices that are 
emerging in Russia during this process of transformation. 
In conclusion, the analysis of Russian oil & gas and banking industries through the lens 
of M&A activity showed that M&A characteristics are both extremely industry-specific 
and country-specific. The conjuncture of the M&A activity in two different sectors of the 
same economy can be unbelievably different, almost the opposite. Moreover, despite an 
extremely large base of knowledge accumulated on the topic, there is still no scientific 
consensus on lots of various aspects of M&A and it stills seems like every single case is 
different from the other and no general conclusions can be made. That indicates a huge 
need for more research, especially qualitative research with the usage of primary data 
obtained from interview. That also means that there will always be potential for further 
research of M&A activity for economists around the world, as long as there are 
unresearched cases, and they will always be there since the new ones are appearing every 
day. 
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Figure 1. Timeline of M&A activity in Russian oil & gas industry 





Figure 1 (continued). Timeline of M&A activity in Russian oil & gas industry 




Acquirer Target Year Acquired stake Valuation 
Yukos VNK 1997 54,0% $1.83 bln 
TNK ONAKO 2000 85,0% $1.27 bln 
TNK  SIDANKO 2001 40,3% n/a 
TNK (50%) + Sibneft (50%) Slavneft 2002 100,0% $1.86 bln 
Rosneft Yukos 2004 77,0% $24.63 bln 
Gazprom Sibneft (Gazpromneft) 2005 72,6% $18 bln 
Rosneft TNK-BP 2013 100% $56 bln 
Rosneft Bashneft 2016 50% $10 bln 
 
Figure 2. Table of main M&A in Russian oil & gas industry 
 
 











Acquirer Target Year Acquired stake Valuation 
GE Money Delta-bank 2004 100,0% $100 mln 
Societe Generale Rosbank 2005-2008 50%+1 $4.6 bln 
Banca Intesa KMB-Bank 2005 75,0% $120 mln 
Raiffeisen 
International 
Impeksbank 2006 100,0% $550 mln 
VTB PSB 2006 75,0% $770 mln 
Nordea Orgresbank 2006 75,0% $417 mln 
Deutsche Bank UFG 2006 100% $700 mln 
UniCredit 
Aton Broker, Aton International 
Ltd. 
2006 100% $424 mln 
KBC Group Absolut Bank 2007 92,5% $1.03 bln 
Barclays Expobank 2008 100,0% $745 mln 




Oil & Gas Banking 
Extremely high involvement of the state, a 
lot of political motivation behind the M&A 
activity 
Low involvement of the state, more purely 
economic motivation for M&A 
Very little involvement of foreign players Foreign banks dominated in the M&A activity 
Motivation: competitors going bankrupt, 
opportunity for easy growth through 
acquisition 
Motivation: growing attractiveness of a large, 
newly emerged market 
Low degree of interdependnce between the 
acquirer and the target 
Higher degree of interdependence, the target 
benefits from acquirer's foreign brand 
A fairly monopolistic market, about 20 major 
players at inception 
More than 1000 banks in the beginning 
Key target characteristic for M&A is the price 
Key target characteristic for M&A is the size 
and previous ownership (local vs. foreign) 
Trend towards consolidation of the market 
Preoccupation of foreign investors with potential cultural gaps 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of key characteristics of M&A activity in oil & gas and banking 
industry in Russia 
